People could be seen dancing in the streets on the night of 12th October 1999, when airports had been taken over, telephones stopped working in Islamabad and Sharif’s home town Lahore; the Army had taken over the government. The whole world was expecting this not to mention Sharif himself, who had just sacked Musharraf with the apprehension in his mind that if he did not do so, Musharraf will take over the reigns. Musharraf eventually did manage to take over the government, but there will be questions in people’s mind what really happened on 12th October 1999.
The history between Musharraf and Sharif begins to unfold in the aftermath of dismissal of General Jehangir Karamat, who was chief of army staff at that time. Musharraf was superseded above many senior generals, so that Sharif could manipulate him more easily, and made the army chief. Army was unhappy at the removal of General Karamat and at the attempts of Sharif to gain full control of the country through Shariah Law. This was considered as an attempt to nullify military establishment and bureaucracy. The turning point occurred in May 1999 when Pakistan army and Kashmiri militants sought control of the Kargil area in Kashmir supposedly on Musharraf’s orders. Pakistan gained tactical advantage and Indian Army was suffering heavy casualties there. What was more alarming for Indian PM, Atal Bihari Vajpai, was the fact that it all came after his visit to Lahore, when both countries were trying to solve their half a century old issues.
By late May and early June 1999, a serious military conflict was underway along a hundred and fifty kilometers border in the Kargil area. Pakistan denied its involvement; a claim which was not taken seriously anywhere around the world. The whole situation was further clouded for the outside observers because it was unclear that who was calling the shots in Islamabad. Sharif seemed to be genuinely interested in the peace process that had started in February 1999, while General Musharraf remained in a different mold. He was said to be a hardliner who had wanted to settle the score with India once and for all.
Given the nuclear capabilities of both South Asian neighbors, United States was forced to intervene. At first United States undersecretary Thomas Pickering informed both sides about its concerns in late may. Then US secretary of state, Madeline Albright, called Sharif, while General Tony Zinni called Musharraf, asking them both to withdraw Pakistani backed forces from Kargil. That message did not work. So, United States went public condemning the Pakistani initiative in the disputed territory and asked Pakistan to pull its troops back. The American stand made Sharif realize the fact that Pakistan was left isolated at the international forum and even evergreen partner China asked both sides to exercise restraint. By the end of June, Sharif had started to seek for American help to solve the problem. (Riedel, 2002)
On the 2nd of July, Sharif called President Bill Clinton asking him if he could visit Washington. President Clinton told him in clear terms he will only help in facing Pakistan’s face in international community if Pakistan was ready to withdraw its troops from Kargil. At that time Sharif seemed desperate to stay in power and it was obvious that his military was not backing him and was even trying to get him out of power. On 4th of July, Sharif finally arrived in Washington. He brought his whole family with him fearing that he might not be able to go back to Pakistan if he withdrew the forces. He told Washington that his military was asking him to take a tougher stand on Kashmir issue while he personally felt obliged to Lahore peace process. Washington was already annoyed at Sharif for carrying out the Nuclear Tests in May 1998 despite the offers of economic and military aid. US-Pakistan relationship was not helped by Pakistan’s involvement in Kargil either. Clinton told Sharif that once Kargil was over, India would have more credibility with US than Pakistan. Sharif was disappointed at American response and asked Clinton to help him stay in power and save Pakistan’s face. On 4th of July a joint statement was issued where Sharif announced troops’ withdrawal from Kargil to the displeasure of military back home.
The situation further deteriorated in Pakistan’s political arena. US knew that strings were being pulled by Army headquarters in Rawalpindi rather than Islamabad. Army was not at all happy at Sharif’s decision to withdraw the forces rendering the military a loser in the whole power game. Series of events, from General Karamat’s sacking to Sharif’s Shariah Law to Kargil withdrawal, had lead the army to believe that Sharif was trying to offset Army’s influence in country’s affairs. Army had started to plan a coup. At the army’s headquarters in Rawalpindi, it had been decided that if Sharif took another step against the Army’s will, he will be overthrown.
Sharif was aware of the whole scenario and knew where to look for help. In September 1999, he sent his brother Shahbaz to Washington to inform them that all was not well in Islamabad. According to Bruce Riedel, special adviser to the President of United States, Shahbaz was interested in making Washington realize that his brother needed Washington’s help to stay in power. (Riedel, 2002) He told Clinton that a military coup was inevitable, but Washington denied any such intelligence information. Clinton told him that Washington won’t interfere in the internal affairs of any other country, a claim that could be found false in many other examples.
The final nail in Sharif’s coffin arrived on the evening of 12th October, 1999, when Musharraf was aboard a plane on his way back from Sri Lanka, he provoked the army to rebel by sacking him. Sharif made the grave mistake of not taking the army in confidence before committing such attempt. Musharraf’s plane was bound for Karachi when Sharif sacked him. Karachi airports’ runway lights had been turned off and the runway was blocked by fire vehicles. Musharraf was called to the cockpit of the plane and was told about the whole situation. He was told that his plane won’t be allowed to land anywhere in Pakistan jeopardizing the lives of hundreds of people in that plane. The pilot told him that the plane did not have much fuel to continue to Dubai and Musharraf won’t agree to land in India. (Jones, 2002)
He asked the pilot to inform the authorities about the situation and how it could end hundreds of innocent lives. Sharif was made aware of this fact, and he asked General Ziauddin, the newly appointed army chief, to take over the Nawabshah airport, in northern Sindh, and ordered the plane to be refueled and forced to leave. By this time Army had become aware of the ground realities and took charge of the things. They took over Sharif’s residence and put him under house arrest. The newly appointed army chief was with Sharif and he was taken into custody as well. The next step that army took was to take over Karachi Airport and inform the pilot to come back to Karachi. Musharraf was made aware of the ground situation, but he was not ready to believe it. He considered it as a plan to capture him. He ordered the plane to stay in air despite the fact that fuel was going down. It was not until he had talked to a close friend who was a general in Army that he decided to land in Karachi. (Jones, 2002)
The aftermath of the whole 12th October scenario came in the shape of the military coup. The list of reasons may go on and on but the fact remains that the incidents that lead to 12th October, include the running over of Supreme Court by Sharif’s supporters, removal of General Jehangir Karamat, the nuclear tests of May 1998, Shariah law and Kargil war. Sharif stood alone amidst the Military, United States and Pakistani public. United States did not help him because they were annoyed at him for nuclear tests and Kargil war. Military never came to terms with him and Pakistanis in general didn’t like him for his government’s socio-economic policies. The lessons to be learnt here are that no matter how much you advocate democracy, the reality is much different. In a country like Pakistan, where history is marred with dictatorships after every decade democracy can’t work. People might say that United States doesn’t play an active role in Pakistan’s foreign policy anymore, but even the most recent and significant event in our history shows that no matter how much we deny it, we are still a victim of colonialism or neo-colonialism or whatever name you might like to give. Maybe someday we’ll be able to stand up on our feet and take our decisions on our own. Till then our prime ministers and presidents will keep on flying to Washington and obey the orders of their capitalist masters.
Reference:
Riedel, Bruce. American Diplomacy and 1999 Kargil Summit.2002. Center for the Advanced Study of India, Pennsylvania University,
